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Abstract
Incentives for the development of renewable energy have increasingly become an instrument
of climate policy, that is, as a means to reduce GHG emissions. This research analyzes the
German experience in promoting renewable energy over the past decade to identify the ex-
post cost of reducing CO2 emissions in the power sector through the promotion of renewable
energy, specifically, wind and solar. A carbon surcharge and an implicit carbon price due to
the renewable energy incentives for the years 2006-2010 are calculated. The carbon surcharge
is the ratio of the net cost of the renewable energy over the CO2 emission reductions resulting
from actual renewable energy injections. The net cost is the sum of the costs and cost savings
due to these injections into the electric power system. The implicit carbon price is the sum of
the carbon surcharge and the EUA price and it can be seen as a measure of the CO2 abatement
efficiency of the renewable energy incentives. Results show that both the carbon surcharge and
the implicit carbon price of wind are relatively low, on the order of tens of euro per tonne of
CO2, while the same measures for solar are very high, on the order of hundreds of euro per
tonne of CO2.
Keywords
Renewables incentives, wind energy, solar energy, abatement cost, EU ETS.
 
1 Introduction
In adopting the Climate and Energy Package in 2009, the European Union (EU) made the
promotion of Renewable Energy (RE) a distinct element of climate policy. As stated in the first
of the ninety-seven whereas’s in the Renewable Energy Directive (2009/28/EC),
"the increased use of energy from renewable sources [...] constitutes an important
part of the package of measures needed to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and
comply with the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change (UNFCCC), and other further Community and international green-
house gas emission reduction commitments beyond 2012."
As for the Emissions Trading System (ETS), a companion measure in the Climate and Energy
Package, the Renewable Energy Directive implies an additional incentive to increase the RE
share and thereby reduce greenhouse gas emissions below what they would otherwise be. Un-
like the ETS, the additional incentive is not uniform throughout the EU. Instead, each member
state is expected to develop a national "support scheme" to ensure achievement of that mem-
ber states’ share of the EU-wide target of a 20% share of gross energy consumption from RE
sources by 2020. Those support schemes can take various forms, but all provide some extra in-
centive that can be seen as comparable to the carbon price created by the ETS. It is only natural
then to ask: what is the real price paid by consumers to abate CO2 emissions? And what is the
implicit CO2 abatement cost embodied in these RE support schemes?
To respond to these questions, we estimate the carbon surcharge and the implicit carbon
price associated with RE incentives (REI). The carbon surcharge measures the additional cost to
reduce CO2 emissions in the power sector over and above the carbon price resulting from the EU
ETS. The implicit carbon price is the sum of the carbon price and the carbon surcharge, thereby
providing an estimation of the CO2 abatement efficiency of the REI. This paper calculates the
carbon surcharge and the implicit carbon price for wind and solar energy in Germany for the
years 2006-2010. Germany is the member state that has played as large a role as any in the
expansion of RE in the EU. The German Renewable Energy Act (EEG), which came into force
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in 2000, defined a system of feed-in tariff (FIT) for all renewable technologies that triggered an
impressive growth of wind and solar capacity. Wind capacity grew more than four-fold from 6
GW in 2000 to 27 GW in 2010, solar capacity more than twenty-fold from 76 MW in 2000 to
17 GW in 2010 (BMU, 2012).
The carbon surcharge is calculated as the ratio of the net cost of RE over the CO2 emis-
sion reductions due to the RE injections into the electric power system. For the quantity of CO2
abated as a result of injections of wind and solar energy for the years 2006-2010, we use the
estimates of Weigt et al. (2012) calculated using a deterministic unit commitment model of the
German electricity system. Most of the paper is devoted to estimate the net cost of renewable.
This is the sum of the costs and cost savings associated with the use of RE in generating electric-
ity. Other benefits -whether they are expressed as energy security, innovation, jobs, non-CO2
emissions, etc.- are not included, nor are costs associated with transmission and distribution.
Our analysis is restricted to the impact of RE on the power sector. When we refer to
emissions abatement, we always mean the reduction of CO2 emissions in the German electricity
generation system. Actually, because of the EU ETS cap on these emissions, increasing RE in
the German electricity sector does not reduce the EU-wide CO2 emissions. Instead, emissions
reduction in the German electricity sector is displaced to other ETS sectors in Germany and in
other EU member states. Hence, the carbon surcharge should not be considered as the total CO2
abatement cost due to the injection of RE1 but as an estimate of how much German consumers
have paid to reduce CO2 emissions in the German power sector in addition to what is already
paid as a result of the EU ETS.
We define the implicit carbon price of the REI as the sum of the carbon surcharge plus the
average carbon price paid in the EU ETS by conventional generators. This can be seen as the
hypothetical carbon price that would make RE economic or, in other words, as an estimation of
the equivalent total carbon price being paid when we think of REI as a carbon instrument alone
(without EU ETS). The relative efficiency of the REI as an instrument to reduce CO2 emissions
can be obtained by comparing the implicit carbon price with the hypothetical EUA price that
1The total CO2 abatement cost due to the injection of RE can be seen as infinity since total ETS emissions are
capped.
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would exist without the REI. In this work, we do not attempt to estimate the effect of the REI
on the EUA price. Still, a comparison of the implicit carbon of the REI with estimates of what
the EU ETS price might be without the REI provides robust preliminary results.
Our paper is the first, to our knowledge, to estimate the cost of RE to abate CO2 emissions
from an ex-post point of view. There is a number of studies that have analyzed the costs and
benefits of renewable generation from an ex-ante point of view (e.g. Denny and O’Malley (2007)
for Ireland, Dale et al. (2004) for UK, Holttinen (2004) for Nordic countries, DEWI et al.
(2005) for Germany). Some of them, such as Holttinen (2004) and DEWI et al. (2005), have
also estimated the cost to reduce CO2 emissions resulting from the injection of the RE into the
power system. DEWI et al. (2005) estimated the "CO2 avoidance cost" of wind energy, which is
the equivalent of our carbon surcharge. It compares the net cost and CO2 emissions the system
would have in 2007, 2010 and 2015 between two scenarios: the first one with the future wind
capacity remaining the same as in 2003, and second one with a larger wind capacity that is
developed thanks to the RE support scheme. Results depend on the assumptions made for the
fuel and carbon prices. With a carbon price in the range ofe5-10 per tCO2, the estimated annual
CO2 avoidance cost of wind in the years 2007 and 2010 goes from a minimum of e56.6/tCO2
to a maximum of e168.0/tCO2. The results from these works are difficult to compare because
of the different methodologies, data and scenarios analyzed (Holttinen et al., 2011).
Regarding ex-post analyses using historical data, the research on the costs and benefits
of RE into the power system has mostly focused on the impact of RE on the electricity price
(e.g. Sensfuß et al. (2008) for Germany, Sáenz de Miera et al. (2008), Gelabert et al. (2011) for
Spain, Jónsson et al. (2010) for Denmark). The analyses show that the injection of RE reduces
the wholesale price of electricity, often called the merit order effect, and that the savings can
be large enough to exceed the total annual expenditure for FIT, as was the case for Germany
in 2006 (Sensfuß et al., 2008). Others (Gelabert et al., 2011) have found that, although present
initially, the merit order effect disappears over time. We do not assess the benefits of RE from
their impact on the electricity price, as we directly estimate the costs and benefits of RE from the
analysis of the power generation costs. However, in section 2 we explain how the benefits of RE
that we take into account relate with the merit order effect. There is also a substantial amount
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of literature available - both theoretical and empirical - on renewable incentives. The focus of
the empirical studies is mostly on the comparison of the different support schemes and in their
effectiveness to promote the deployment of renewable technologies (Lipp, 2007; Fouquet and
Johansson, 2008; Steinhilber et al., 2011), but not on the cost to reduce CO2 emissions.
In contrast to these studies, our paper is the first, to our knowledge, to estimate the cost of
REI to abate CO2 emissions from an ex-post point of view. We do not asses the benefits of RE
in terms of impact on the electricity price, but we directly estimate the costs and benefits of RE
by analysing the power generation costs. However in section 2 we explain how the benefits of
RE that we take into account relate with the merit order effect.
In the remainder of the paper, section 2 provides a categorization and general discussion of
the costs and cost savings associated with the use of wind and solar energy. Section 3 describes
in detail the methodology used to estimate these costs and cost savings. Section 4 presents the
results and a sensitivity analysis. Section 5 concludes.
2 Costs and cost savings of renewable generation
This section briefly describes the six cost and cost saving components taken into account in
calculating the cost of abating CO2 emissions by promoting wind and solar energy in the elec-
tricity sector. We also discuss why the merit order effect is not one of these components. The
included components are associated with the cost of generation behind the busbar, that is, ex-
cluding the cost that may be incurred in connecting these generating sources to the grid, as well
as any costs or cost savings associated with congestion in the operation of the transmission and
distribution system. Finally, as stated earlier, other possible benefits from the use of RE related
to energy security, non-CO2 related emissions, or jobs are also excluded. The cost components
that are included are the remuneration to generators, additional balancing cost and additional
cycling costs. The cost savings components are the cost savings from the avoided fossil fuel use
and carbon costs, and those from added generating capacity.
An important aspect of the costs of wind and solar energy is intermittency, which in-
cludes two independent aspects: non-controllable variability and partial unpredictability (Pérez-
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Arriaga and Batlle, 2012). Every power plant, including fossil fuel generation, is variable and
unpredictable to a certain degree, but wind and solar power plants present these characteristics
at a much higher level. The unpredictability of wind and solar energy could be expected to
increase the cost of balancing the electric power system, while its variability has an impact on
cycling cost.
2.1 Remuneration to generators
Producers of renewable generation are remunerated at a rate that is on average higher than the
price at which the electricity they produce could be sold in the wholesale market. This higher
remuneration can take various forms. In the case of Germany, it takes the form of guaranteed
FITs or fixed prices whose costs are charged to consumers. Many studies that analyze the cost
of renewable generation focus on the generation cost, which in the case of RE consists almost
entirely of the initial capital cost and the return on the initial investment. While many have
commented on the extent to which this cost has been declining, cost data on actual capital
outlays are not available for either renewable or competing fossil generation. A more accessible
metric is the price paid for the output, which can be expected to cover all relevant costs in
well-functioning markets, as well as extra profit and unanticipated losses in some instances.
The payments to producers are real expenditures and they are the starting point for devising
any relevant metric of cost. In the case of the German FIT, payments are front-loaded and we
explain in the subsequent methodology section how we avoid over-stating this cost in the early
years of the RE program, by equalizing the annual remuneration along lifetime of the power
plants.
2.2 Additional cycling costs
Cycling refers to the operations of conventional plants required to respond to load variations
and cycling cost is the cost related to them (Lefton et al., 1997). The increase of energy from
intermittent generation reduces the demand for conventional thermal generation and may cause
the output of those plants to vary more than would otherwise be the case. This increases cycling
costs (Pérez-Arriaga and Batlle, 2012). Firstly, fossil fuel plants could have more start-ups
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and shut-downs of production, implying an increase of start-up and ramping costs. Secondly,
because of the decrease in the demand for thermal generation, conventional power plants tend
to work at a lower capacity factor than the one designed for maximum efficiency. Thirdly, the
increase of the cycling activity accelerates component failure and increases maintenance costs.
The increase of cycling costs is higher especially when more cycling is required to fossil units
that were designed for base-load operation (Troy et al., 2010).
2.3 Additional balancing cost
The electric system needs supply and demand to be exactly balanced at all times. The balancing
operation refers to the actions undertaken by the TSO to ensure that demand is equal to supply
in and near real time. Due to sudden disturbances, such as unanticipated fluctuations of load or
electric short circuits, the system operators must make relatively small adjustments with respect
to the scheduled dispatching. The balancing is made by purchasing services from generators or
adjustable loads whose costs are paid by consumers in the electricity retail price. The system
balancing reserve is the provision of capacity the system operator can deploy for balancing the
system in real time. The unexpected fluctuations of intermittent generation increase the varia-
tion of supply in the short-term. This implies more balancing operations as well as additional
system balancing reserves (Milligan et al., 2010). The amount of the additional balancing cost
due to intermittent generation depends on many factors such as the level of wind and solar pen-
etrations, the quality of weather forecast, the flexibility of the existing generation portfolio, the
balancing market rule.2 With regard to wind, a number of studies have been carried out on the
balancing cost. Results indicate that the additional reserve requirement, as a proportion of the
wind capacity installed, tends to be relatively small and that the additional balancing cost is
about a few euro per MWh of wind energy, also for high wind penetration (Gross et al., 2006;
Holttinen et al., 2011; IEA, 2011). This is because short run fluctuations of wind energy are
comparable with other variations of supply and demand (Gross et al., 2006).
2Some studies under balancing cost also include the loss of efficiency in the use of existing conventional
generation in the medium term due to the additional cycling cost (Holttinen et al., 2011).
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2.4 Fuel cost saving
From the perspective adopted in this paper, the fixed price paid in Germany for RE generation
buys a joint product: electricity and CO2 abatement. Priority access to the grid, not to mention
near-zero variable costs of generation, means that when available renewable generation nearly
always displaces conventional fossil fuel generation, typically either coal or natural gas. The
cost of the fossil fuel required to generate the electricity thus displaced is a cost saving since
it is what would be paid out to produce the same amount of electricity. Consequently, it must
be subtracted from the payment to generators to isolate the additional cost for abating CO2
emissions. This cost saving depends on the quantity and prices of the coal or natural gas not
purchased, but figuring out what is displaced when wind or solar generation is injected into
the grid is not easy. In this paper, the quantity and type of fossil fuel combustion avoided is
taken from the simulations of the German electricity system for the years 2006-10 performed
by Weigt et al. (2012). The quantities of each fuel displaced are those indicated by the difference
between the scenario calibrated to replicate observed load and injections with the counterfactual
scenarios in which the only change is that the RE injections are taken away. The quantities thus
indicated are multiplied by the fuel prices, to determine the fuel cost savings, or more broadly,
what would have been the cost of generating an amount of electricity equal to the RE injection.
Since natural gas prices are always higher than coal prices, cost savings are greater per MWh
of displaced natural gas generation than for coal generation. The fuel prices are exogenous and
therefore not affected by the reduction in fuel demand occasioned by RE injections. The price
for oil, coal and gas are now determined in the global market, and this variation of demand in
Germany is assumed not to be significant in the global market.
2.5 Carbon cost saving
Carbon cost savings are determined in the same manner as the fuel cost savings, that is, as the
difference in quantities between the calibrated observed simulation and the appropriate counter-
factual, using typical emission factors for the fossil fuel combustion avoided and actual average
monthly allowance prices. In contrast to fuel cost savings, carbon cost savings are greater
for displaced coal generation than for natural gas generation since the emissions avoided by
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displaced coal generation are higher than for natural gas. Carbon prices are also treated as ex-
ogenous, but the assumption that these prices are not significantly affected by RE injections in
Germany is subject to serious challenge. We treat the carbon price as exogenous because of the
absence of reliable estimates of the effect of RE injections on the carbon price.
2.6 Capacity saving
Developing renewable generation increases generation capacity in the system, although not
by the same amount as equivalent fossil-fuel generating capacity since intermittent generation
does not provide the same degree of reliability. Nevertheless, the equivalent amount of avoided
dispatchable capacity is not zero since on average the amount of fossil generation required is
less. Hence some conventional capacity could be retired or, alternatively, less conventional
capacity would need to be built in the future. The capacity credit is the amount of conventional
capacity that can be displaced by intermittent plants while preserving the same level of system
security and is generally expressed as a percentage of the installed capacity of intermittent
generators (Gross et al., 2006). The capacity cost saving consists of the fixed cost of building
or maintaining the conventional capacity no longer needed as a result of the capacity credit.
There is a large literature on wind energy addressing this issue (see Gross et al. (2006), Giebel
(2005), IEA (2011) for a comparison of studies). Results show that the capacity credit depends
on many factors such as the quantity and distribution of wind, the level of energy storage, the
network system; its value differs from country to country. If calculated as percentage of installed
capacity, it tends to decrease with penetration of wind energy. Previous studies agree that the
capacity credit is never zero, but that it can be small.
An important concept related to capacity credit, and often used to calculate the cost of
wind generation, is back-up capacity. This is the conventional capacity reserve that would
make wind generation as reliable as an equivalent amount of conventional dispatchable capacity.
Back-up capacity is complementary to the capacity credit: the lower the capacity credit, the
higher is the required back-up capacity. (Gross (2006) shows the analytic relation between the
back-up cost and the capacity saving.) The relationship between the capacity credit and back-
up capacity cost can be illustrated by a simple example. Imagine a system that is anticipating
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additional load that would require 100 MW of conventional dispatchable capacity. If one starts
with building 100 MW of wind capacity, then the cost of the required back-up capacity must
be added. In nearly all instances, the required back-up capacity will be less than 100 MW.
Alternatively, one can start with 100 MW of dispatchable capacity, then add wind capacity, and
determine how much less dispatchable capacity would be needed because of the added wind
capacity. The analysis presented in this paper takes the latter approach as more appropriate
when wind is added to an existing system with adequate conventional capacity to meet demand,
as is the case in Germany. The cost savings results either from some existing capacity that
no longer needs to be maintained or from new capacity that will not have to be built to meet
anticipated demand.
2.7 Merit order effect
The merit order effect is the reduction of wholesale electricity price as result of the RE injec-
tions, which is sometimes argued as a cost savings that should be counted against the subsidy
paid for RE (Sensfuß et al., 2008). Fig. 1 presents a stylized representation of the effect of in-
jecting RE energy into the electricity system and it is used to explain why the savings resulting
from the merit order effect is not included.
QRE
P
PRE
Q
MC
a
b c
d
e f
g
Figure 1: merit order effect. MC: marginal cost of conventional generators; Q(QRES):
demand of electricity from conventional generators without(with) renewable energy in the
system; P(PRES): price of electricity without(with) renewable energy in the system.
The line MC represents an approximation of the dispatch order of conventional generation
plants on a typical electrical system in which those with the lowest variable or marginal cost are
dispatched ahead of high variable cost plants. Absent injections of wind or solar generation, the
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generation demanded of this set of plants, would be Q, the wholesale price for electricity, P, and
the amount paid to generators in the wholesale market, abcd. Of this amount, acd represents
variable costs incurred in the generation of Q electricity while abc is the producer’s surplus or
infra-marginal rent from which capital and other fixed costs are recovered. When wind or solar
generation is injected into this system, the demand upon these generators is reduced to QRE , the
price commensurately to PRE , and the amount paid to these generators, to aefg. The difference
in payments to displaced generators is the shaded area of Fig. 1. Of this reduced payment, one
component consists of real costs not incurred, gfcd representing avoided variable/fuel costs,
while the other component, bcfe representing infra-marginal rent, is an avoided payment to
generators for the fixed costs of the capacity in service.
The gfcd component is identical in concept to the fuel cost savings discussed in section
2.4 above. The bcfe component is a transfer payment, which may or may not be passed on to
final consumers depending on the regulations governing the prices paid by final consumers and
provisions for maintaining unused capacity on line. For instance, if the regulatory system guar-
antees the recovery of fixed costs for generators and abcd is the amount that fully compensates
generators for fixed and variable costs of existing capacity, then payments for fixed costs must
increase with increased RE injections. Alternatively, if the recovery of fixed costs is not guar-
anteed, the loss incurred by generators will lead to the retirement of existing unused capacity or
a higher threshold price for building new capacity. In fact, the loss of this infra-marginal rent is
the origin of the debate about the need for capacity markets or alternative capacity payments to
maintain sufficient dispatchable capacity to meet load in the presence of intermittent generation.
These capacity payments reflect the difference between the capacities that could be retired if RE
generation were fully dispatchable and that which can be retired notwithstanding intermittency.
The capacity credit discussed in section 2.6 above captures the cost savings for the capacity that
is no longer needed and can be retired.
In our cost accounting, we do not include the infra-marginal rent component of the merit
order effect since either it will not be realized at the retail level because of regulatory treatment
or some other arrangement will be devised to maintain sufficient capacity to meet demand at
all times. Moreover, the capacity credit captures whatever savings in fixed-cost compensation
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are to be achieved as a result of reduced capacity needs. Our treatment is much simpler than
including the full merit order effect and then estimating substitute capacity payments. We start
from the point that however adequate the current system of compensation to generators without
RE may be, equivalent compensation will need to be maintained in one form or another for all
capacity except that represented by the capacity credit.
3 Methodology
In this session we present the methodology used to calculate the carbon surcharge and the
implicit carbon price. We first define the carbon surcharge and the implicit carbon price and how
they are related to the costs and cost savings described in the previous section. Subsequently
we present in detail how we calculate all the costs and cost savings for the German case.
We calculate the annual REI carbon surcharge (CaS) for the years 2006-2010 by compar-
ing the annual costs of renewables and the emissions in generating electricity in two scenarios:
the historical scenario, which we call observable scenario (OBS), and the counterfactual sce-
nario where we suppose that no RE was injected into the system (NoRES). More precisely, CaS
is given by the net cost of renewable (NC) divided by the CO2 emission reduction due to the in-
jection of renewable energy (A) in a given year. The net cost of renewable, NC, is the sum of all
the annual costs and benefits (which are in the form of cost savings) resulting from the injection
of renewable energy into the power system and can be seen as the sum of three components.
The first is the total remuneration earned from generating electricity from renewable energy
(Rem), which accounts for the direct cost of the REI. The second is the difference between the
total costs of producing electricity from conventional generators (TC) in the OBS scenario and
the same cost in the NoRES scenario: TC(OBS)−TC(OBS). This takes into account only the
impact of RE on the short-term cost of generating electricity from conventional generation, as
we consider the same conventional capacity in the OBS and NoRES scenario. The third com-
ponent is the capacity saving (CapSav) which comprises the impact of RE on the capital cost of
conventional generation. The CO2 emission reduction due to the injection of renewable energy,
A, is given by the difference in the total emissions between the OBS scenario (E(OBS)) and the
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NoRES scenario (E(NoRES)). In formulas, we have:
CaS =
NC(OBS)
A
=
Rem+(TC(OBS)−TC(NoRES))−CapSav
A
(1)
where
A = E(NoRES)−E(OBS) ,
TC(OBS) = T FC(OBS)+TCC(OBS)+TCyC(OBS)+T BC(OBS) ,
TC(NoRES) = T FC(NoRES)+TCC(NoRES)+TCyC(NoRES)+T BC(NoRES) . (2)
TC is given by the sum of the total fuel cost (T FC), the total carbon cost (TCC), the
total cycling cost (TCyC) and the total balancing cost (T BC). The fuel cost saving (FCSav)
and carbon cost saving (CCSav) are given by the difference in the total fuel costs and total
carbon costs between the OBS and NoRES scenario. The additional cycling cost (ACyC) and
the additional balancing cost (ABC) as the difference in the total cycling cost and total balancing
cost between the NoRES and OBS scenario. The definition of the costs and the savings are such
that they are all positive and the net cost is given by the sum of the costs minus the savings:
CaS =
Rem+AdCyC+AdBC−FCSav−CCSav−CapSav
A
, (3)
where
FCSav = T FC(NoRES)−T FC(OBS) ,
CCSav = TCC(NoRES)−TCC(OBS) ,
AdCyC(OBS) = TCyC(OBS)−TCyC(NoRES) ,
AdBC(OBS) = T BC(OBS)−T BC(NoRES) . (4)
Regarding the carbon price, we do not consider any interaction between the EU ETS and
the REI: we simply use as EUA prices in the NoRES scenario the same prices as those in the
12
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OBS scenario. Thus TCC(OBS)=Pobs∗E(OBS) and TCC(NoRES)=Pobs∗E(NoRES), where
Pobs is the historical average carbon price paid by fossil fuel generators, and CCSav = Pobs ∗A.
In Appendix A, we have extended the methodology to include the change of the EUA price
due to the interaction between the REI and the EU ETS. It shows that the effect on the carbon
surcharge is ambiguous. For example, a higher EUA price will increase the carbon surcharge
by reducing the emission abatement due to the RE injection, but it will also decrease it because
a higher carbon price implies higher fuel cost saving and carbon cost savings. We did not make
any attempt to empirically estimate these effects, for the reason that we can find no modeling
that provides an estimate of the EU-wide reduction in demand for allowances due to RE policy
and estimation of the relationship between changes in demand for EUAs and the effect on price.
Effectively, we treat the observed EUA price as if it were a fixed annual tax.
The implicit carbon price (ICP) is equal to the carbon surcharge, as defined in Eq. (3),
plus the average carbon price Pobs, or equivalently is given by calculating the carbon surcharge
without considering the carbon cost saving in the net cost:
ICP =
Rem+AdCyC+AdBC−FCSav−CapSav
A
=CCSav+Pobs . (5)
The ICP can be seen as an estimation of the implicit abatement cost of the REI, that is the cost
of abating CO2 when we think of the REI as a carbon instrument alone, or, in other word, as
the hypothetical carbon price that would recover the cost of RE. Appendix B provides a proof
for the German case when the carbon price is the same in the (NoRES) scenario as in the (OBS)
scenario.
The rest of the section presents in detail how we calculated the annual costs and cost
savings of wind and solar energy in Germany for the period 2006-2010.
3.1 Remuneration to generators
The relevant law in Germany (EEG) provides producers of RE a 20-year guaranteed FIT (in
addition to generation in the year of installation), which is different for wind and solar en-
ergy. Power producers of wind energy receive an initial high tariff for a period ranging from
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a minimum of 5 years up to 20 years, and a final low tariff (about 60% lower) for the remain-
ing period.3 The length of the initial period depends on the characteristics of the power plant.
Plant-specific data on how long the producers receive the high tariff are not available, but ac-
cording to the 2011 EEG-Progress Report published by the German government (BMU, 2011),
more than half of the power plants receive the initial tariff payment over 20 years and more than
three-quarters at least for 15 years. The level of the initial and final tariffs depends on the year
of installation of the turbines and both are annually reduced by a fixed percentage. For example,
wind energy generated by on-shore power plants installed in 2010, is remunerated by an initial
and final FIT that are 1% lower than for the energy generated by the power plants installed in
2009.
With regard to FIT for solar energy, producers receive a fixed tariff for 20 years. For the
period 2000-2003, the level was the same for all solar power plants; from 2004 on, it depends
on the characteristics and location of the installation. As for wind, the levels of solar FIT for
new installed capacity are annually reduced by a fixed percentage. The levels and the annual
reductions of solar and wind FIT were first defined in year 2000 and subsequently revised in
2004, 2009 and recently in 2011. Table 1 shows the levels of FIT for new installed capacity for
the period 2000-2010 (EEG, 2000, 2004, 2009). It also shows the total annual FIT expenditure,
that is, the total amount spent annually for solar and wind FIT.4 All FIT are nominal.
Since the FIT diminishes in value over time both in nominal and real terms, taking the
amount paid for the FIT in a given year would make wind and solar energy appear more expen-
sive in the first years of activities, when the payments are relatively generous, and cheaper in the
following years. Consequently, the structure of payments over time requires some equalization
to avoid over- and understating cost in the early and later years of the facilitie life. We do so in
the following way for all capacity installed in a given year.
First, we assume a 25-year lifetime for all solar and wind power plants (IEA/NEA, 2010)
and estimate remuneration for each vintage based on observed wind or solar generation in each
3The minimum length of the initial period is 5 years for on-shore power plants, 9 years for off-shore power
plants commissioned before year 2004, and 12 years for off-shore power plants commissioned afterwards.
4Data for the total annual expenditure are provided by the German TSOs: www.eeg-
kwk.net/de/EEG_Jahresabrechnungen.htm.
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Wind 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
On-shore IT [¢/kWh] 9.10 9.10 8.96 8.83 8.70 8.53 8.36 8.19 8.02 9.20 9.11FT [¢/kWh] 6.19 6.19 6.10 6.01 5.50 5.39 5.28 5.18 5.07 5.02 4.97
Off-shore IT [¢/kWh] 9.10 9.10 8.96 8.83 9.10 9.10 9.10 9.10 8.92 15.00 15.00FT [¢/kWh] 6.19 6.19 6.10 6.01 6.19 6.19 6.19 6.19 6.07 3.50 3.50
Expenditure [Bne] 1.44 1.70 2.30 2.44 2.73 3.51 3.56 3.39 3.34
Solar 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Minimum rate [¢/kWh] 50.62 50.62 48.09 45.68 45.70 43.42 41.24 39.18 37.22 31.94 28.43
Maximum rate [¢/kWh] 50.62 50.62 48.09 45.68 57.40 54.53 51.80 49.21 46.75 43.01 39.14
Expenditure [Bne] 0.08 0.15 0.28 0.68 1.18 1.60 2.22 3.16 5.09
Table 1: wind and solar FIT. IT: initial tariff; FT: final tariff. Expenditure: total annual
expenditure for wind and solar FIT. The level of the solar FIT depends on the capacity and
location of the solar plant and ranges between the Minimum rate and Maximum rate. All
the data are in nominal value. Sources: for the level of the FIT, elaboration from EEG
(2000, 2004, 2009); for the expenditures data are provided by the German TSOs. To our
knowledge there are no data publicly available on the total expenditure for wind and solar
FIT for the period 2000-2001.
year through 2010 assuming equal annual capacity factors for each in-service vintage and based
on an assumed capacity factor for the remaining years of activity of that vintage.5 Then, that
stream of payments is discounted at the fixed rate of 7% and summed to get an initial Net
Present Value (NPV) of all the remunerations.6 Finally, the resulting NPV is converted into a
mortgage-like equal annual remuneration by redistributing it over 25 years. We assume that all
the installations built before year 2000 (about 4GW for wind and 32MW for solar) were com-
missioned in year 2000.7 The equalized remuneration for all turbines in a given year consists of
the sum of the equalized payments to each vintage of capacity in service that year. For example,
the equalized remuneration for year 2006 is given by the sum of the annualized payments of the
vintages built between 2000 and year 2006 because all capacity constructed from 2000 is still
in activity in 2006. All remunerations are calculated in e(2011) in order to take into account
inflation. For the period 2000-2011 the average annual historical CPI rate of the German Fed-
eral Statistical Office is used (see table 15),8 while from 2012 we assume a constant rate of 2%
(the average annual inflation in Germany in 1990-2011 was 2.17%).
5We assume that all capacity is installed on the first of January.
6The existing literature on cost of generation electricity generally uses a cost of capital between 5% and
10% (IEA/NEA, 2010).
7This assumption is justified because the capacity built before year 2000 was low compared to the capacity
constructed between 2000 and 2010 (especially with regard to solar energy), and because the EEG gives FIT also
to power plants built before 2000 as if they were commissioned in 2000.
8www.destatis.de.
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Table 2 shows the annually installed wind and solar capacities and the amount of electric-
ity generated. For the period from 2010 to the end of the lifetime of the plants, we assume that
all power plants have the same capacity factor equal to 18.0% for wind and 8.1% for solar, as
the average capacity factors in 2006-2010.
Wind 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Total capacity [GW] 6.1 8.8 12.0 14.6 16.6 18.4 20.6 22.2 23.8 25.7 27.2
Installed capacity [GW] 1.7 2.7 3.2 2.6 2.0 1.8 2.2 1.6 1.6 1.9 1.5
Wind electricity [TWh] 9.5 10.5 15.8 18.7 25.5 27.2 30.7 39.7 40.6 38.7 37.8
Off-shore electricity [GWh] 38 174
Solar 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Total capacity [MW] 76 186 296 435 1105 2056 2899 4170 6120 9914 17320
Installed capacity [MW] 44 110 110 139 670 951 843 1271 1950 3794 7406
Solar electricity [GWh] 64 76 162 313 556 1282 2220 3075 4420 6583 11683
Table 2: Total capacity: total installed capacity; Installed capacity: annual installed capac-
ity; Wind electricity: total final electricity produced by wind energy; Off-shore electricity:
total final electricity produced by off-shore wind energy; Solar electricity: total final elec-
tricity produced by solar energy. Source: BMU (2012).
The price of electricity paid to wind and solar energy depends on the level of FIT for the
first 20 years of activity, after that power plants receive remuneration from selling electricity
into the market. We assume that the market price of electricity is e50/MWh in real terms
(average electricity price 2006-2011 was e47.7/MWh). Due to inflation, the real level of the
FIT decreases annually. If it goes below the assumed electricity price, the power producers
sell electricity in the market. In other words, producers receive at least e50/MWh of energy
generated.
With regard to FIT for wind energy, for the period 2000-2010 our assumption is that all
wind power plants received the initial high FIT.9 For the years after 2010, it is assumed that
50% of power plants receive the initial high tariff for 20 years and the other 50% for 15 years.
In addition to this scenario, which is called Medium FIT, section 4.2 shows results for two other
FIT scenarios. Regarding FIT for solar energy, we assume that the average FIT earned by all
newly installed solar capacity in its first year of activity would be the same for all 20 years.
Additionally details on the calculation are in Appendices C and D. In section 4.2 we present
9For the years 2002-2010, the difference between the total annual wind remuneration based on this assumption
and the total historical expenditures for FIT of table 1 is no higher than 0.5%.
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results for scenarios with different assumptions regarding cost of capital, future inflation rate,
cost of electricity and level of FIT.
Table 3 shows the results for the equalized remuneration and the total annual expenditures
for FIT for wind and solar energy for the period 2006-2010. For wind, the results refer to the
Medium FIT scenario. The level of remuneration to generators increases over the years with
the increase of wind and solar capacity and our equalized remuneration is always lower than
the actual annual expenditures for FIT, except in 2010 for wind when the wind capacity factor
was especially low. Actual annual expenditure for FIT depends on the amount of RE generated,
and therefore on the actual capacity factor in contrast to the lifetime average capacity factor
assumed in the calculation of equalized remuneration. While the wind capacity factor was
lower in 2010 (15.9%), it was higher in 2007 and 2008 (20.43% and 19.43%). Consequently, in
table 3 equalized remuneration is lower than the expenditure for FIT in 2007-2008 and higher
in 2010.
Wind 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Expenditure for FIT [Me] 2979 3737 3696 3512 3419
Equalized remuneration [Me] 2684 2873 3056 3291 3486
% 90% 77% 83% 93% 102%
Solar 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Expenditure for FIT [Me] 1282 1702 2303 3266 5207
Equalized remuneration [Me] 966 1351 1893 2882 4503
% 75% 79% 82% 88% 86%
Table 3: wind and solar generation costs. Expenditure for FIT: total annual expenditure
for the wind and solar FIT (cf. table 1). Equalized remuneration: annual equalized remu-
neration. %: percentage of Equalized remuneration vs. Expenditure for FIT. Data are in
Me(2011).
3.2 Fuels cost saving and carbon cost saving
For the estimation of the fuel cost saving and carbon cost saving we make use of the model
of Weigt et al. (2012). This is a deterministic unit commitment model of the German electricity
market for the period 2006-2010. The model minimizes total generation costs, including start-
up cost, on an hourly time frame and it is calibrated to reproduce observed yearly generation
by fuel. The generation cost and the hourly demand, as well as technical parameters, are ex-
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ogenous while the electricity price and the dispatching schedule are endogenous. Perfect com-
petition and perfect foresight of load and RE injections are assumed. The model dataset uses
detailed information on all conventional facilities in Germany with more than 100 MW gen-
eration capacity by plant and fuel types, and aggregated information for smaller power plants.
Data come from VGE (2005, 2006, 2009), Umweltbundesamt (2011), Eurelectric (2010) and
company reports. Marginal generation costs consist of fuel and emission costs. Natural gas
and coal prices are exogenous and assumed not to be significantly affected by the reduction in
demand occasioned by RE injections in the German electricity system. Average monthly fuel
prices for oil, gas, and coal are used and they come from the Federal Office of Economics and
Export Control (BAFA, 2011). In all scenarios the EU ETS carbon price is exogenous and equal
to the historical values. The carbon prices used are monthly average EUA prices from the Eu-
ropean Energy Exchange (EEX). Data for start-up cost and shut-down times come from DENA
(2005), Schröter (2004). The model considers differences in plant efficiencies due to the differ-
ent lifetime of the plants as in Schröter (2004), but does not take into account efficiency losses
resulting from a lower utilization due to renewable injection. Demand level accounts for im-
port and export and is based on data from ENTSO-E (2011). Data for hourly wind input are
provided by the four German network operators. Data for solar and biomass injections are not
available for the full time frame and an average monthly profile has been estimated based on the
hourly injection levels provided for the East German region by the TSO 50Hertz Transmission.
Consequently, the model accounts for the high variability of wind injection but not for solar
variations. Biomass is running with a relative constant profile. The model has been calibrated
by modifying the marginal generation costs of coal and gas plants and the availability factors.
For more details see Weigt et al. (2012).
Table 4 presents the total annual CO2 emissions and the fuel and carbon costs in the OBS,
No Wind and No Solar scenarios. Fuel cost consists of the expenditure for buying fuels for coal,
gas, nuclear and lignite generation. The total annual CO2 emissions reduction, fuel cost saving
and carbon cost saving are calculated by taking the values of the emissions and costs in the No
Wind and No Solar scenarios and subtracting those in the OBS scenario.
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Wind 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
CO2 emissions
OBS [MtCO2] 307 318 297 282 287
No Wind [MtCO2] 329 344 329 312 314
CO2 emission reduction [MtCO2] 22 26 32 30 27
Fuel cost
OBS [Me] 10621 10622 13875 10423 11111
No Wind [Me] 11726 12104 15718 11705 12433
Fuel cost saving [Me] 1105 1482 1843 1281 1322
Carbon cost
OBS [Me] 5302 192 5090 3733 4276
No Wind [Me] 5651 221 5513 4121 4668
Carbon cost saving [Me] 350 29 422 388 393
Solar 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
CO2 emissions
OBS [MtCO2] 307 318 297 282 287
No Solar [MtCO2] 308 320 301 287 295
CO2 emission reduction [MtCO2] 2 2 4 5 7
Fuel cost
OBS [Me] 10621 10622 13875 10423 11111
No Solar [Me] 10719 10739 14080 10649 11519
Fuel cost saving [Me] 98 117 205 226 407
Carbon cost
OBS [Me] 5302 192 5090 3733 4276
No Solar [Me] 5327 193 5168 3795 4386
Carbon cost saving [Me] 26 1 78 63 110
Table 4: total annual CO2 emission reduction, fuel cost saving and carbon cost saving due
to wind and solar energy. Data are in nominal value.
3.3 Additional start-up cost
Regarding cycling costs, we restrict our analysis only to the start-up cost, which is the cost of
the additional fuel needed to start-up the plant, because the model of Weigt et al. (2012) does not
consider other cycling costs.10 As it was done for fuel cost saving, we calculate the additional
start-up cost due to wind(solar) as the difference of start-up costs in the OBS scenario and No
Wind(No Solar) scenario, table 5. First we notice that, in most of the years, the start-up costs
10The model considers start-up restrictions for coal and lignite fired steam plants of several hours downtime
while gas turbines have no start-up restrictions. It also assumes that all plants can technically be shut down after
one hour of operation, and does not consider externally defined minimum run-time.
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are lower in the observed scenario than in the scenarios without wind and solar energy. In these
years, plants continuing in service always do experience greater start-up costs when we inject
RE, but there are just fewer plants starting up and shutting down when intermittent generation
is present. This result probably also reflects the assumption of perfect foresight with respect
to the intermittent RE injections, which would allow for an optimal utilization of the existing
generation fleet. Second, we see that the start-up costs in all scenarios are always much lower
than the avoided fossil fuel cost (less than 2%), and consequently the additional cycling cost are
much lower than the fuel cost saving. Also the other cycling costs, such as ramping cost, are
always much lower than the avoided fuel cost, at least one order of magnitude smaller (Van den
Bergh et al., 2013), and we can infer that our results would not change much if all cycling costs
could be added to our analysis.
Wind 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
start-up cost
OBS 173 156 212 199 207
No Wind 178 169 217 197 203
Additional start-up cost -5 -13 -5 2 4
Solar 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
start-up cost
OBS 173 156 212 199 207
No Solar 175 159 213 209 207
Addition start-up cost -2 -3 -1 -9 0
Table 5: Additional start-up cost due to wind and solar energy. Data are in nominal value.
3.4 Additional balancing cost for wind
The model of Weigt et al. (2012) considers perfect foresight of load and RE and cannot be
used to estimate balancing cost. However, a number of studies have examined the additional
balancing cost for wind energy. Estimations are in the order of e1-4/MWh of wind energy
for wind penetrations up to 20% (Holttinen, 2008).11 GreenNet project estimates a cost of
Germany of e2 per MWh of wind energy with a 10% wind penetration by comparing the
system operational costs in a simulation model run with stochastic wind power forecasts and
in the same model where the equivalent wind production is predictable and constant (Meibom
11In the period 2006-2010 wind penetration in Germany did not exceed 7%.
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et al., 2006). We use this value for our assessment of the balancing cost. Our goal is not so
much an accurate calculation of the additional balancing cost as it is an estimation of its order
of magnitude in comparison with other costs and cost savings. Table 6 shows the balancing cost
for wind.
Wind 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Balancing cost per MWh of wind energy [e/MWh] 2 2 2 2 2
Wind energy generated [TWh] 31 40 41 38 36
Additional balancing cost [Me] 61 79 81 77 76
Table 6: additional balancing cost for wind. Data are in Me(2011).
3.5 Wind capacity saving
In order to estimate the capacity benefit we must estimate how much, when and which kind
of conventional capacity is displaced because of the additional wind generation. This kind of
assessment would require a detailed analysis of the development of the German system in the
next years, which goes beyond the scope of this study. We will therefore estimate the capacity
benefit for wind only, based on results from existing literature and on simple and transparent
assumptions. As for the additional balancing cost, our goal is not so much an accurate calcula-
tion of the capacity saving as it is an estimation of its order of magnitude in comparison with
other costs and cost savings. As shown in section 4.2 the magnitudes concerning solar energy
are such that the capacity credit will have little bearing on the final abatement cost.
In order to estimate the cost savings for wind from capacity no longer required, we assume
that the capacity installed up to 2010 would provide a credit of 7%. One study (DENA, 2005)
shows a capacity credit of 6-8% in Germany for a wind capacity of 14.5GW, while a capacity
of 36GW would have a capacity credit of 5-6%. Considering that in 2010 there was a wind
capacity of 27GW, a 7% capacity credit is a realistic value. We assume that these cost savings
from all wind capacity built before 2010 are realized in 2015. This means that in Germany, in
2015 the constructed conventional capacity will be lower by 7% of the wind capacity installed
in the period 2000-2010 than it would be otherwise. We suppose that the wind capacity credit
will substitute 70% of coal and 30% of gas. Coal is displaced more than gas because wind
power plants need flexible gas-fired generation to cope with wind fluctuations. In order to make
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an estimation of the economic benefit, we calculate the savings in capital cost and fixed O&M
cost of the conventional plants displaced by the wind capacity credit. For the O&M cost, we
consider all the years when wind generators are active (envisaging the lifetime of a wind turbine
of 25 years). For example, in 2006 about 2GW of wind capacity was installed which will last up
to 2031. This wind capacity provides a capacity credit of 120MW. As a result, we assume that
in 2015, investment in 84MW of coal capacity and 36MW of gas capacity will not be needed
and that from 2015 to 2031 the corresponding fixed O&M costs will not be spent because of the
wind power plants installed in 2006. As is done for the equalized remuneration to generators,
the NPV of these savings is calculated by discounting and summing them up to the year of
installation of the wind capacity at a 7% cost of capital. Subsequently, we annualize them over
the lifetime of the wind power plant by redistributing the NPV in a 25 years mortgage using
the same interest rate to spread this cost savings over all the tons of CO2 abated over the life
of the turbine. Finally, the total cost savings for a given year is provided by the sum of the
mortgage rates of the capacity in service in that year. For overnight cost, data are from NEA
(2011) (e1978/kW for coal and e883/kW for gas in e(2011)), as to fixed O&M cost, data
derive from EIA (2010) (e29/kW for coal and e11/kW for gas in e(2011)). We consider a
capacity factor of 85% both for coal and gas (IEA/NEA, 2010). Table 7 shows the cost savings
due to the capacity credit and the components due to the avoided capital and O&M cost. The
increase of these cost savings over the years reflects the increase of wind capacity. We do not
estimate the balancing cost and capacity saving for solar energy, but in the sensitivity analysis
we show that their impact on the final result would be minor.
Wind 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Capital cost saving 95 106 117 130 142
O&M cost saving 10 12 13 15 16
Capacity saving 106 117 130 145 158
Table 7: wind capacity saving. Capital cost saving: annualized capital cost saving; O&M
cost saving: annualized fixed O&M cost saving; Capacity saving: sum of Capital cost
saving and O&M cost saving. Data are in Me(2011).
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4 Results and comments
This section presents the results of our analysis. Section 4.1 presents and comments on the
carbon surcharge and implicit carbon price of the REI for wind and solar technologies while
sections 4.2 and 4.3 discuss the robustness of these results. Section 4.2 presents the impact
on the final results of the assumptions made to calculate the different costs and benefits, with
particular attention to remuneration to generators. Section 4.3 discusses the inclusion of the
learning rate on our methodology.
4.1 Carbon surcharge and implicit carbon price
Table 8 shows annual carbon surcharges and annual implicit carbon prices as a result of the
injection of wind and solar energy into the power system in euro per tCO2. The net cost is
given by the sum of the costs minus cost savings. The carbon surcharge for wind(solar) is the
net cost for the year divided by CO2 emission reduction, which is the simulated quantity of CO2
emissions reduced by the injection of wind(solar) energy in that year. The implicit carbon price
is given by the net cost without carbon cost saving divided by CO2 emission reduction. Average
is the average annual CO2 abatement costs weighted over CO2 emission reductions. For wind
energy, results are for the Medium FIT scenario. Figs. 2 and 3 show the costs and cost savings
graphically per tCO2 abated and per MWh of wind(solar) energy injection, respectively. Costs
are above zero, cost savings are below and the black bar indicates the carbon surcharge in Fig. 2
and the net cost per MWh of wind(solar) energy in Fig. 3. All data are in e(2011).
Three main results can be drawn.
1. There is a large disparity among different costs and cost savings. Equalized remuneration
to generators is by far the largest cost; the additional start-up cost and the balancing cost
represent just a few percentage of it. Fuel cost savings are the largest savings while
carbon cost savings and the capacity savings are much lower although not irrelevant. Fig.
(2) clearly shows that net costs are mostly determined by the remuneration to generators
and the fuel cost savings. The other costs and benefits are much smaller (start-up costs are
too small to appear in the figures). Note that the vertical scale for the cost of solar energy
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Wind 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Average
Equalized remuneration [Me] 2684 2873 3056 3291 3486
Additional start-up cost [Me] -6 -14 -5 2 4
Additional balancing cost [Me] 61 79 81 77 76
Fuel cost saving [Me] 1204 1578 1913 1326 1352
Carbon cost saving [Me] 381 31 438 402 402
Capacity saving [Me] 106 117 130 145 158
Net cost [Me] 1050 1212 651 1498 1654
CO2 emission reduction [MtCO2] 22 26 32 30 27
Carbon surcharge [e/tCO2] 47 47 21 51 62 45
Implicit carbon price [e/tCO2] 64 48 34 64 77 57
Solar 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Average
Equalized remuneration [Me] 966 1351 1893 2882 4503
Additional start-up cost [Me] -2 -3 -1 -10 0
Fuel cost saving [Me] 107 124 212 234 417
Carbon cost saving [Me] 28 1 81 65 113
Net cost [Me] 829 1223 1599 2574 3973
CO2 emission reduction [MtCO2] 2 2 4 5 7
Carbon surcharge [e/tCO2] 552 627 439 557 547 537
Implicit carbon price [e/tCO2] 571 627 461 571 562 552
Table 8: annual carbon surcharge and annual implicit carbon price for wind and solar energy.
Equalized remuneration: see table 3; Additional start-up cost, Fuel cost saving, Carbon cost
saving and CO2 emission reduction: see table 4; Capacity saving: see table 7; Balancing
cost: see table 6; Net cost: sum of all the costs minus the savings; Carbon surcharge: Net
cost divided CO2 emission reduction; Implicit carbon price: Net cost without Carbon cost
saving divided CO2 emission reduction; Average: annual average Carbon surcharge and
Implicit carbon price weighted over CO2 emission reductions. Data are in e(2011).
is different than that for wind energy because of the significantly higher remuneration to
solar generators.
2. There is a large difference between the carbon surcharge for wind and solar energy. While
the carbon surcharge cost for wind is of the order of tens of e/tCO2, for solar it is of the
order of hundreds of e/tCO2. Fuel cost savings per tCO2 are similar for wind and solar
energy, being slightly higher for solar than for wind since solar energy is generated only
during the day and displaces mostly gas when peak demand occurs, while wind is active
day and night and it displaces cheaper coal as well as gas. What drives the difference
between wind and solar is the remuneration: the annual equalized remuneration per MWh
is much higher for solar than for wind, as shown in Fig. 2. This reflects the higher level
of solar FIT, see table 1. Comparing these results with the historical annual average
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Figure 2: (a) costs and cost savings of wind energy per tCO2 abated. (b) costs and cost
savings of solar energy per tCO2 abated. Costs are positive numbers, cost savings are
negative numbers. Data are in e(2011)/tCO2.
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Figure 3: (a) costs and cost savings of wind energy per MWh of wind energy generated.
(b) costs and cost savings of solar energy per MWh of solar energy generated. Costs are
positive numbers, cost savings are negative numbers. Data are in e(2011)/MWh.
25
Marcantonini and Ellerman
EU ETS carbon price (table 9) the carbon surcharges of wind tend to be higher than
EUA prices but of the same order of magnitude (the price of allowances reached levels
of e30/tCO2 in April 2006). On the other hand, the implicit carbon prices for solar
were always much above the prices for the EUA. Similar results can be observed for the
annual implicit carbon prices. The implicit carbon price for wind is, on average, 20%
higher than the carbon surcharge, but it remains always on the order of tens of e/tCO2.
For solar the difference between the implicit carbon price and the carbon surcharge is
very small, on average of 3%. If the implicit carbon price is compared with the historical
annual average EU ETS carbon price, the result is the same as for the comparison with the
carbon surcharge. Note, however, that it may be considered more meaningful to compare
the REI implicit carbon price with the hypothetical EUA price that it would have been in
the absence of the REI. In the absence of good empirically based estimates of the price-
quantity relationship, we might assume for the sake of illustration that the effect was so
high that the German RE injections would have decreased the EUA price by 50%. If so,
the annual average EUA price would have been at maximum no more than e40/tCO2.
The same conclusion would be reached: the implicit carbon price of wind tends to be
higher than the annual EUA prices but of the same order of magnitude, while the implicit
carbon price for solar is always much above any realistic EUA price.
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Average
EUA 18.9 0.7 12.4 13.6 14.7 10.7
Table 9: average annual EUA price. Source: EEX. Data are in e(2011)/tCO2.
3. The carbon surcharge and the implicit carbon price can change considerably from year
to year, particularly for wind where variations by a factor of two can be observed. These
changes in net cost mostly reflect changes in annual fuel cost saving and carbon cost
saving, which are correlated with the variations of fossil fuel prices and the carbon prices.
Fig. (4 - a) presents wind fuel cost saving per MWh of wind energy and the annual average
price of coal, gas and oil. Fig. (4 - b) shows carbon cost saving per tCO2 and the annual
average EUA price. In contrast, the remuneration to generators is relatively constant.
The year 2008 is the one with the lowest values for the carbon surcharge and the implicit
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Figure 4: (a) wind fuel cost saving per MWh of wind energy generated and annual average
fossil fuel prices, data are in e(2011)/MWh. Source for fuel prices: BAFA (2011). (b) wind
carbon cost saving per MWh of wind energy and EUA average annual price, data are in
e(2011)/tCO2. Source for carbon price: EEX.
carbon price, due to a combination of high fossil fuel prices and, with regard to wind
energy, a high annual capacity factor.
4.2 Sensitivity analyses
The results presented in section 4.1 refer to the base case scenario that considers a 2% future
rate of inflation, e50/MWh future electricity price and a 7% cost of capital. The results for
wind are from the Medium FIT scenario where 50% of power plants are assumed to receive
the initial high tariff for 20 years and the remaining 50% for 15 years. Table (10) shows the
annual carbon surcharges for wind under different assumptions regarding the remuneration to
generators. In the High FIT scenario we suppose that all the power plants receive the high tariff
for 20 years, and all the power plants installed from the year 2009 receive the extra bonus.12
In the Low FIT scenario we suppose that 50% of power plants receive the high tariff for 20
years, 25% for 15 years and, for the remaining 25%, 5 years for on-shore power plants and 12
12From 2009 there is a technological bonus of ¢0.5/kWh for on-shore wind, and ¢2/kWh for off-shore wind.
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years for off-shore power plants . Table 10 shows that the carbon surcharges for wind do not
considerably differ under these scenarios. On average, they go from a minimum of e39/tCO2
in the Low FIT scenario with 5% cost of capital, up to a maximum ofe51/tCO2 in the High FIT
scenario with 10% cost of capital. Results under different scenarios are very close to each other
because most of the variations in remuneration affect future revenues, which are discounted.
Wind 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Average
Base case
Low FIT 44 45 18 48 59 42
Medium FIT 47 47 21 51 62 45
High FIT 49 49 22 53 65 47
1% inflation
Low FIT 46 46 20 50 61 44
Medium FIT 48 48 22 53 65 46
High FIT 51 51 24 55 68 49
e40/MWh electricity price
Low FIT 43 43 17 46 57 40
Medium FIT 45 45 19 49 60 43
High FIT 48 48 21 52 64 45
e70/MWh electricity price
Low FIT 50 50 23 54 66 48
Medium FIT 51 51 24 55 67 49
High FIT 52 51 25 56 68 50
5% cost of capital
Low FIT 41 42 16 44 55 39
Medium FIT 43 43 18 47 58 41
High FIT 47 47 21 51 62 45
10% cost of capital
Low FIT 50 50 22 52 64 47
Medium FIT 51 51 24 55 67 49
High FIT 54 54 26 57 69 51
Table 10: carbon surcharge of wind under different scenario regarding remuneration to gen-
erators; 1% inflation: 1% future rate of inflation after 2011 inflation; e40/MWh electricity
price: e40/MWh future electricity price; e70/MWh electricity price: e70/MWh future
electricity price; 5% cost of capital: cost of capital of 5%; 10% cost of capital: cost of cap-
ital of 10%. Results presented in section 4.1 are for the Base case - Medium FIT scenario.
Data are in e(2011)/tCO2.
Table 11 shows the annual carbon surcharge of wind under different assumptions regard-
ing the capacity credit, it presents two extreme cases of 0% and 20% capacity credit, in addition
to the base case of a 7% capacity credit. The higher the capacity credit, the greater the cost sav-
ings, and the lower the carbon surcharge. Average annual carbon surcharge is e54/tCO2 with
0% capacity credit and e43/tCO2 with 20% capacity credit. This analysis confirms the result
that, even if wind capacity benefit is not irrelevant to determine carbon surcharge, its impact is
28
The Implicit Carbon Price of Renewable Energy Incentives in Germany
not predominant.
Wind 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Average
0% capacity credit 62 46 32 62 74 54
7% capacity credit 47 47 20 50 62 44
20% capacity credit 50 35 23 50 60 43
Table 11: carbon surcharge with different values of capacity credit. Results presented in
section 4.1 are with 7% capacity credit. Data are in e(2011)/tCO2.
Table 12 shows the annual carbon surcharge for solar under different assumptions regard-
ing the remuneration to generators. Also for solar, results do not differ considerably from the
base case scenario. They range from a minimum average carbon surcharge of e521/tCO2 in
the scenario with 5% cost of capital up to e562/tCO2 in the scenarios with 10% cost of capital.
We did not calculate the capacity saving and the additional balancing cost for solar, how-
ever their impact on the final results would be very small. To show it, we assume that solar
energy has the same additional balancing cost and capacity saving as wind in absolute term,
that is the same values shown in table 8. This is a large overestimation as the total solar capac-
ity is about two thirds of wind capacity, and solar capacity factor is less than half with respect
to wind capacity factor. Nevertheless, under these generous conditions the average solar annual
carbon surcharge would only increase of less than 7% if we added the additional abatement cost
and would decrease of less than 4% if we added capacity saving, remaining on average always
around e500/tCO2.
All sensitivity analyses performed show that the annual carbon surcharges for wind re-
main of the order of few tens of e/tCO2, while the annual carbon surcharges for solar remain
of the order of hundreds of e/tCO2.
4.3 Learning effect
A frequent argument in favor of subsidies for the development of RE development is the learn-
ing effect: future costs will be less because of learning-by-doing from today’s subsidized de-
ployment. We have not included this potential cost savings because of the strong required as-
sumption that the future cost savings can be attributed to the deployment in one specific country
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Solar 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Average
Base case 552 627 439 557 547 537
1% inflation 568 647 456 582 576 561
e0/MWh electricity price 546 620 433 550 539 530
e40/MWh electricity price 551 625 438 556 545 536
e70/MWh electricity price 554 629 441 560 550 540
5% cost of capital 534 608 424 540 530 521
10% cost of capital 578 655 460 583 572 562
Table 12: carbon surcharge of solar under different scenarios regarding remuneration to
generators; 1% inflation: 1% future rate of inflation after 2011 inflation; e40/MWh elec-
tricity price: e40/MWh future electricity price; e70/MWh electricity price: e70/MWh
future electricity price; 5% cost of capital: cost of capital of 5%; 10% cost of capital: cost
of capital of 10%. Results presented in section 4.1 are for the Base case scenario. Data are
in e(2011)/tCO2.
when learning is notoriously international. There is, in addition, another attribution problem:
to which vintage(s) should future cost savings be attributed? Alternatively, when are learning
effects from a particular investment exhausted and how are they realized over time?
Also to be noted is that the level of remuneration to RE generators in Germany assumes
a considerable degree of cost reduction over time as shown in table 1. For wind, the level of
the initial FIT decreased from ¢9.10/kWh in 2000 to ¢8.02/kWh in 2008, or by almost 12% in
nominal terms. In real terms the FIT declined by 23% at an annual rate of about 3.3%. It is
evident from the various adjustments in the initial tariff and the rate of decline over the years,
that the regulator has had a hard time getting this right. Still, even after the notable adjustment
in 2009, when the initial FIT was increased by 15% to ¢9.20/kWh, the real level of the initial
FIT was 12% lower than the 2000 level, for a real rate of decrease in remuneration of about
1.5% per annum. For solar the decrease was much higher: the highest tariff went from ¢50.62
/kWh in 2000 down to 28.43/kWh in 2010, more than 30% in nominal terms, and 24% in real
terms with an annual rate of 13%. Both for solar and wind, the reduction of FIT will continue
in the next years.
If the attribution problems can be overlooked, and the reduction in the level of German
FIT for new RE capacity can be only credited to the learning effect due to the construction of the
past capacity in Germany, a methodology similar to that employed for calculating the equalized
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remuneration to generators can be used to estimate the impact of the learning effect. This can be
done by first estimating the lifetime revenues for all the capacity build from 2000 to 2020 and
then discounting all revenues and redistributing them annually per quantity of RE electricity
produced as if all electricity produced by all capacity build in the period 2000-2020 would
have been paid the same amount. In other words, remuneration is equalized not only along the
lifetime of a given installation as before, but also along the capacity build in different years.
In this way we reduce the annual equalized remuneration of the past capacity by effectively
credited it with the benefit of the lower payments for future capacity due to the expected FIT
reduction. In order to estimate future payments, assumptions need to be made about the quantity
of capacity build in the future and how much the electricity produced by this capacity will be
paid. The following estimates are based on scenarios provided by the German government
when available, or on optimistic assumptions regarding the RE development and FIT decrease.
For solar, a 3.5GW annual capacity increase from 2013 with a 11% annual FIT reduction is
indicated by the reference scenario of the last amendment of the EEG (EEG, 2012). For wind,
a 1.5% annual FIT reduction is projected (EEG, 2012), and we assume an annual increase of
wind capacity of 2.5 GW (average new annual capacity in 2006-2010 was 1.7GW). We also
assume that from 2011 only 20% of new wind capacity will have high FIT for 20 years, while
30% will have high FIT for 15 years and 50% for 5 years. For all the other parameters (such as
power plant lifetime, capacity factors, cost of capital etc.) the same assumptions used in section
3.1 are maintained. When the resulting learning effects are attributed to the period 2006-2010,
the average carbon surcharges are e36/tCO2 for wind and e290/tCO2 for solar (e45/tCO2
and e537/tCO2 respectively without learning effects) while for the implicit carbon prices are
e48/tCO2 for wind and e306/tCO2 for solar (e57/tCO2 and e552/tCO2 respectively without
learning effects). For wind, the decrease in cost is just of few euro per tCO2, while for solar,
because of the much higher projected FIT reduction, the decrease is almost 50%. However this
does not change the basic conclusion: the carbon surcharge and implicit carbon price of REI are
in the tens of euro per tCO2 for wind, and of the order of hundreds of euro per tCO2 for solar,
higher than the observed price of CO2 in the EU ETS even if the learning effect is included.
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5 Conclusions
This paper analyses CO2 abatement cost due to wind and solar energy in Germany for the years
2006-2010. We calculated the REI annual carbon surcharge as the ratio of the net cost of RE
over the CO2 emission reductions attributed to RE, and the implicit carbon price of the REI as
the sum of carbon surcharge plus the average annual price in the EU ETS paid by conventional
generators. For wind, the carbon surcharge for the period 2006-2010 is on average e45/tCO2
and the implicit carbon price is e57/tCO2. These are higher than the historical EU ETS carbon
price but of the same order of magnitude. In contrast, for solar, the annual carbon surcharges
and the implicit carbon prices are very high, the average for 2006-2010 is e537/tCO2 for the
first and e552/tCO2 for the latter, much above any possible realistic carbon price. The main
cost component is the remuneration to generators determined by the FIT. In comparison, the
additional start-up cost and balancing cost are quite small, if not negligible. The main cost
saving comes from the avoided fuel cost of the electricity generation displaced by the RE. The
other cost saving components -the carbon cost saving and the capacity benefit- are smaller but
not irrelevant, particularly in the case of wind. The carbon surcharge and implicit carbon price
have changed considerably over the years due to variations in fossil fuels prices, carbon price
and the amount of generated RE. The year 2008 is the one with the lowest values due to a
combination of high fossil fuel prices and, with regard to wind energy, a high annual capacity
factor. Under several sensitivity analyses, the carbon surcharge and the implicit carbon price of
REI always remain of the order of few tens e/tCO2 for wind energy, while for solar energy are
always of the order of hundreds of e/tCO2.
Our study suggests that if we look at RE only as a climate instrument, and at REI only
as a policy to abate CO2 emissions in the power sector, the German support for wind energy
has induced a reduction of CO2 emissions at a cost generally higher than the historically ob-
served EUA price, but on the same order of magnitude. On the contrary, supporting solar energy
through deployment incentives has proven to be a very expensive way of reducing CO2 emis-
sions.
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Appendices
A Impact of the interaction between the REI and the EU ETS on the carbon surcharge
The REI carbon surcharge (CaS) in section 3 is calculated by comparing the cost of renewables
and emissions in two scenarios: the historical scenario (OBS) and a counterfactual scenario
where we suppose that no RE was injected into the power system (NoRE). In the estimation
of CaS the interaction between the RE and the EU ETS has not been taken into account: the
EUA prices used in the NoRE scenario are the same prices as those in the OBS scenario. This
appendix shows how the carbon surcharge would change if the interaction between the REI
and the EU ETS is considered. In the absence of RE, the average carbon price in the EU ETS
paid by conventional generators (PnoRE) would have been higher than the observed one (Pobs):
PnoRE ≥ Pobs. This increase of the carbon price would have an impact on the net cost of RE,
as well as on the total emissions, and thus on the estimation of the carbon surcharge. CaSint
is the carbon surcharge calculated by considering the impact of the interaction between the RE
and the EU ETS. It is given by comparing the cost of renewables and the emissions between the
OBS scenario and the counterfactual scenario without RE and with the carbon price affected by
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the reduction of the RE, which is labeled NoRESint .
CaSint =
Rem− (TC(OBS)+TC(NoREint))−CapSav
Aint
=
Rem−FCSavint−CCSavint−CapSav
Aint
, (6)
where
TC(OBS) = T FC(OBS)+TCC(OBS) ,
TC(NoREint) = T FC(NoREint)+TCC(NoREint) ,
FCSavint = T FC(NoREint)−T FC(OBS) ,
CCSavint = TCC(NoREint)−TCC(OBS) ,
TCC(OBS) = Pobs ∗E(OBS) ,
TCC(NoREint) = PnoRE ∗E(NoREint) ,
Aint = E(NoREint)−E(OBS) . (7)
For the sake of simplicity the cycling cost and balancing costs are neglected in this analysis,
as they are marginal if not negligible in comparison with the other costs. Rem and CapSav in
CaSint are the same than in CaS because the remuneration for RE and the deployment of RE
capacity depends on the REI, and not not the carbon price.
The difference between CaSint and CaS (Eq. 3) is:
CaSint−CaS = Rem
(
1
Aint
− 1
A
)
+
(
FCSav
A
− FCSavint
Aint
)
+
(
Pobs−PNoRE
) E(NoREint)
Aint
(8)
The increase of carbon price in the NoREint scenario with respect to NoRE scenario, would
induce a shift of production from coal to gas in NoREint with respect to the NoRE and thus an
increase of the fossil fuel cost (FCSavint ≥ FCSav) and decrease in emissions (E(NoREint) ≤
E(NoRE)). This also implyes Aint ≤ A. Hence the first term in the RHS of Eq. (8) is always
positive, while the second and third terms are always negative. Thus the effect of the interaction
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on the RE and the EU ETS on the carbon surcharge is ambiguous. On the one hand it tends
to increase the carbon surcharge because it decreases the emission abatement due to the RE
injection, on the other hand it tends to decrease the carbon surcharge because higher carbon
price implies higher fuel cost saving and carbon cost saving.
B The implicit carbon price of the REI
This appendix shows that the implicit carbon price as defined in Eq. (5) is a good estimation
(difference lower than 5%) of the CO2 abatement cost of the REI, that is labeled AC, when we
assume that REI is the only climate instrument. AC can be calculated by comparing the cost of
renewables and emissions in generating electricity in two hypothetical scenarios: the scenarios
with and without RE with both scenarios without any carbon price. These two scenarios are
labeled (RE,NoET S) and (NoRE,NoET S). The REI in the (RE,NoET S) and (NoRE,NoET S)
scenarios are the same as in the OBS scenario.
AC =
Rem+(TC(NoRE,NoET S)−TC(RE,NoET S))−CapSav
E(NoRE,NoET S)−E(RE,NoET S) . (9)
Note that there are no carbon costs in TC(NoRE,NoET S) and TC(RE,NoET S) because we
suppose that the carbon price is zero in both scenarios. Rem and CapSav in Eq. (9) are the
remuneration and the capacity saving calculated in the scenario with RE and without EU ETS.
They are equal to those of Eq. (3) because the remuneration for RE and the deployment of RE
capacity, depends only on the REI and not on the carbon price. Weigt et al. (2012) have shown
that, in Germany for the period 2006-2010, there is an interaction in the emission abatement
between the injection of RE and the EU ETS: the CO2 abatement induced by the presence
of both the carbon price and the injection of RE is on average higher than sum of the CO2
abatement due only to RE plus the CO2 abatement due only to the EU ETS. However this
interaction tends to be very small and their model shows that:
E(NoRE,NoET S)−E(RE,NoET S)' E(NoRE)−E(OBS) , (10)
T FC(NoRE,NoET S)−T FC(RE,NoET S)' T FC(NoRE)−T FC(OBS) , (11)
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where OBS and NoRE are the scenarios described in section 3, with the EUA prices in NoRES
scenario equal to those in the OBS scenario. The average differences between the LHS and
RHS for the years 2006-2010 of Eq. (10) is -4% and of Eq. (11) is 2%. These values refer to
the injection of all RE coming from wind, solar and biomass. The value for the injection of
only wind energy or only solar energy would be smaller given the lower penetration. If these
numbers are assumed also for wind and solar, the difference between the ICP defined in Eq. (5)
and the implicit CO2 abatement cost of the REI of Eq. (9) would be less than 2% for wind and
less than 4% for solar. Including the variation of cycling cost and balancing costs due to the
absence of the carbon price, would only marginally change these results because these costs are
small if not negligible in comparison to the other costs and benefits.
C Wind equalized remunerations
This appendix shows in detail the calculations of the equalized remuneration for wind energy
in the Medium FIT scenario. Table 13 shows the estimated annual electricity produced by each
vintage of capacity from year 2000 to year 2010. The years in the first horizontal axis represent
the years of installation, while the ones in the first vertical axis are the years of production.
Each column shows the annual energy produced in 25 years (the assumed lifetime of wind
power plants) by the capacity installed in the year marked in the first row. The entries in the
rows are calculated in the following way: for the period 2000-2010 we allocate the historical
annual electricity generated by wind (shown in table 2) to power plants installed in different
years by assuming an equal annual capacity factor for all power plants. As from 2010 until the
end of the lifetime of the power plants a constant capacity factor of 18% is assumed.
Table 14 shows the annual real price of electricity for wind power plants that receive the
initial high FIT for 20 years. As before, the years in the first horizontal axis are the years of
installation of the power plant, while the ones in the first vertical axis are the years of produc-
tion. Results take into account inflation: the annual historical CPI rate of the German Federal
Statistical Office is used up to 2011 (table 15),13 from 2012 we assume a constant rate of 2%.
All results are in e(2011). Each column shows the annual electricity price paid to wind energy
13www.destatis.de.
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generated by the capacity installed in the year marked in the first row; the values are calculated
by inflating the nominal annual level of FIT (table 1) for the first 20 years of activity. For the
last 5 years of activity, and when the real level of FIT goes below the assumed market price of
e50/MWh, the power producers sell electricity at the market price. Table 16 is analogous to
table 14 but refers to power plants which receive the initial high FIT only for 15 years.
Table 17 shows the annual remunerations in the Medium FIT scenario (where we suppose
that 50% of power plants receive the initial FIT for 20 years and 50% for 15 years). Each
column shows the annual remuneration to wind power plants installed in the year marked in the
first row. Each entry of table 17 is given by multiplying the corresponding entry of table 13
by 0.5 times the sum of the corresponding entries in tables 14 and 16. Table 18 shows the
annualized remuneration for each vintage of capacity from year 2000 to year 2010. In order to
calculate it we discount the remunerations in the columns of table 13 at the fixed rate of 7% to
the first year of activity, sum them up to obtain the initial NPV, and redistribute the NPV through
a 25-year mortgage using the same interest rate. The years 2009 and 2010 show the sum of the
annualized remuneration for on-shore and off-shore wind. The total equalized remuneration
of a given year consists of the sum of the annualized payment for the capacities in service in
that year. For example, the equalized remuneration of year 2008 is given by summing up all
the annualized remuneration from 2000 to 2008 because all capacity build from 2000 is still in
activity in 2008.
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On-shore Off-shore
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2009 2010
2000 9.5
2001 7.3 3.2
2002 8.0 3.5 4.3
2003 7.8 3.4 4.2 3.4
2004 9.4 4.1 5.0 4.0 3.1
2005 9.0 3.9 4.8 3.9 3.0 2.6
2006 9.1 4.0 4.8 3.9 3.0 2.6 3.3
2007 10.9 4.7 5.8 4.7 3.6 3.2 3.9 2.9
2008 10.4 4.5 5.5 4.5 3.4 3.0 3.7 2.7 2.8
2009 9.2 4.0 4.9 3.9 3.0 2.7 3.3 2.4 2.5 2.8 0.04
2010 8.4 3.7 4.5 3.6 2.8 2.4 3.0 2.2 2.3 2.6 2.1 0.04 0.1
2011 9.6 4.2 5.1 4.1 3.2 2.8 3.4 2.5 2.6 3.0 2.3 0.04 0.1
2012 9.6 4.2 5.1 4.1 3.2 2.8 3.4 2.5 2.6 3.0 2.3 0.04 0.1
2013 9.6 4.2 5.1 4.1 3.2 2.8 3.4 2.5 2.6 3.0 2.3 0.04 0.1
2014 9.6 4.2 5.1 4.1 3.2 2.8 3.4 2.5 2.6 3.0 2.3 0.04 0.1
2015 9.6 4.2 5.1 4.1 3.2 2.8 3.4 2.5 2.6 3.0 2.3 0.04 0.1
2016 9.6 4.2 5.1 4.1 3.2 2.8 3.4 2.5 2.6 3.0 2.3 0.04 0.1
2017 9.6 4.2 5.1 4.1 3.2 2.8 3.4 2.5 2.6 3.0 2.3 0.04 0.1
2018 9.6 4.2 5.1 4.1 3.2 2.8 3.4 2.5 2.6 3.0 2.3 0.04 0.1
2019 9.6 4.2 5.1 4.1 3.2 2.8 3.4 2.5 2.6 3.0 2.3 0.04 0.1
2020 9.6 4.2 5.1 4.1 3.2 2.8 3.4 2.5 2.6 3.0 2.3 0.04 0.1
2021 9.6 4.2 5.1 4.1 3.2 2.8 3.4 2.5 2.6 3.0 2.3 0.04 0.1
2022 9.6 4.2 5.1 4.1 3.2 2.8 3.4 2.5 2.6 3.0 2.3 0.04 0.1
2023 9.6 4.2 5.1 4.1 3.2 2.8 3.4 2.5 2.6 3.0 2.3 0.04 0.1
2024 9.6 4.2 5.1 4.1 3.2 2.8 3.4 2.5 2.6 3.0 2.3 0.04 0.1
2025 4.2 5.1 4.1 3.2 2.8 3.4 2.5 2.6 3.0 2.3 0.04 0.1
2026 5.1 4.1 3.2 2.8 3.4 2.5 2.6 3.0 2.3 0.04 0.1
2027 4.1 3.2 2.8 3.4 2.5 2.6 3.0 2.3 0.04 0.1
2028 3.2 2.8 3.4 2.5 2.6 3.0 2.3 0.04 0.1
2029 2.8 3.4 2.5 2.6 3.0 2.3 0.04 0.1
2030 3.4 2.5 2.6 3.0 2.3 0.04 0.1
2031 2.5 2.6 3.0 2.3 0.04 0.1
2032 2.6 3.0 2.3 0.04 0.1
2033 3.0 2.3 0.04 0.1
2034 2.3 0.1
Table 13: assumed annual energy generated by wind power plants installed in different
years. Data are in TWh.
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On-shore Off-shore
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2009 2010
2000 10.8
2001 10.7 10.7
2002 10.6 10.6 10.4
2003 10.5 10.5 10.3 10.2
2004 10.2 10.2 10.1 9.9 9.8
2005 10.1 10.1 9.9 9.8 9.6 9.4
2006 9.9 9.9 9.8 9.6 9.5 9.3 9.1
2007 9.6 9.6 9.5 9.4 9.2 9.0 8.9 8.7
2008 9.5 9.5 9.4 9.3 9.1 8.9 8.8 8.6 8.4
2009 9.4 9.4 9.3 9.2 9.0 8.9 8.7 8.5 8.3 9.6 15.6
2010 9.3 9.3 9.2 9.0 8.9 8.7 8.5 8.4 8.2 9.4 9.3 15.3 15.3
2011 9.1 9.1 9.0 8.8 8.7 8.5 8.4 8.2 8.0 9.2 9.1 15.0 15.0
2012 8.9 8.9 8.8 8.7 8.5 8.4 8.2 8.0 7.9 9.0 8.9 14.7 14.7
2013 8.7 8.7 8.6 8.5 8.4 8.2 8.0 7.9 7.7 8.8 8.8 14.4 14.4
2014 8.6 8.6 8.4 8.3 8.2 8.0 7.9 7.7 7.6 8.7 8.6 14.1 14.1
2015 8.4 8.4 8.3 8.2 8.0 7.9 7.7 7.6 7.4 8.5 8.4 13.9 13.9
2016 8.2 8.2 8.1 8.0 7.9 7.7 7.6 7.4 7.3 8.3 8.2 13.6 13.6
2017 8.1 8.1 8.0 7.8 7.7 7.6 7.4 7.3 7.1 8.2 8.1 13.3 13.3
2018 7.9 7.9 7.8 7.7 7.6 7.4 7.3 7.1 7.0 8.0 7.9 13.1 13.1
2019 7.8 7.8 7.7 7.5 7.4 7.3 7.1 7.0 6.8 7.9 7.8 12.8 12.8
2020 5.0 7.6 7.5 7.4 7.3 7.1 7.0 6.9 6.7 7.7 7.6 12.6 12.6
2021 5.0 5.0 7.4 7.2 7.1 7.0 6.9 6.7 6.6 7.5 7.5 12.3 12.3
2022 5.0 5.0 5.0 7.1 7.0 6.9 6.7 6.6 6.5 7.4 7.3 12.1 12.1
2023 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 6.9 6.7 6.6 6.5 6.3 7.3 7.2 11.8 11.8
2024 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 6.6 6.5 6.3 6.2 7.1 7.0 11.6 11.6
2025 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 6.3 6.2 6.1 7.0 6.9 11.4 11.4
2026 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 6.1 6.0 6.8 6.8 11.1 11.1
2027 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.8 6.7 6.6 10.9 10.9
2028 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 6.6 6.5 10.7 10.7
2029 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 6.4 5.0 10.5
2030 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0
2031 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0
2032 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0
2033 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0
Table 14: annual real prices of electricity paid to wind energy from power plants installed
in different years and receiving the high FIT for 20 years. Data are in ¢(2011)/kWh.
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Annual inflation rate 1.45 1.98 1.40 1.04 1.67 1.56 1.58 2.29 2.63 0.31 1.14 2.30
Table 15: Average annual inflation rate. Source: German Federal Statistical Office,
www.destatis.de.
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On-shore Off-shore
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2009 2010
2000 10.8
2001 10.7 10.7
2002 10.6 10.6 10.4
2003 10.5 10.5 10.3 10.2
2004 10.2 10.2 10.1 9.9 9.8
2005 10.1 10.1 9.9 9.8 9.6 9.4
2006 9.9 9.9 9.8 9.6 9.5 9.3 9.1
2007 9.6 9.6 9.5 9.4 9.2 9.0 8.9 8.7
2008 9.5 9.5 9.4 9.3 9.1 8.9 8.8 8.6 8.4
2009 9.4 9.4 9.3 9.2 9.0 8.9 8.7 8.5 8.3 9.6 15.6
2010 9.3 9.3 9.2 9.0 8.9 8.7 8.5 8.4 8.2 9.4 9.3 15.3 15.3
2011 9.1 9.1 9.0 8.8 8.7 8.5 8.4 8.2 8.0 9.2 9.1 15.0 15.0
2012 8.9 8.9 8.8 8.7 8.5 8.4 8.2 8.0 7.9 9.0 8.9 14.7 14.7
2013 8.7 8.7 8.6 8.5 8.4 8.2 8.0 7.9 7.7 8.8 8.8 14.4 14.4
2014 8.6 8.6 8.4 8.3 8.2 8.0 7.9 7.7 7.6 8.7 8.6 14.1 14.1
2015 5.7 8.4 8.3 8.2 8.0 7.9 7.7 7.6 7.4 8.5 8.4 13.9 13.9
2016 5.6 5.6 8.1 8.0 7.9 7.7 7.6 7.4 7.3 8.3 8.2 13.6 13.6
2017 5.5 5.5 5.4 7.8 7.7 7.6 7.4 7.3 7.1 8.2 8.1 13.3 13.3
2018 5.4 5.4 5.3 5.2 7.6 7.4 7.3 7.1 7.0 8.0 7.9 13.1 13.1
2019 5.3 5.3 5.2 5.1 4.7 7.3 7.1 7.0 6.8 7.9 7.8 12.8 12.8
2020 5.0 5.2 5.1 5.0 4.6 4.5 7.0 6.9 6.7 7.7 7.6 12.6 12.6
2021 5.0 5.0 5.0 4.9 4.5 4.4 4.3 6.7 6.6 7.5 7.5 12.3 12.3
2022 5.0 5.0 5.0 4.8 4.4 4.3 4.2 4.2 6.5 7.4 7.3 12.1 12.1
2023 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 4.3 4.2 4.2 4.1 4.0 7.3 7.2 11.8 11.8
2024 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 4.2 4.1 4.0 3.9 3.9 7.0 2.7 11.6
2025 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 4.0 3.9 3.8 3.8 3.8 2.7 2.7
2026 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 3.8 3.8 3.7 3.7 2.6 2.6
2027 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 3.7 3.7 3.6 2.5 2.5
2028 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 3.6 3.5 2.5 2.5
2029 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 3.5 5.0 2.5
2030 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0
2031 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0
2032 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0
2033 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0
Table 16: annual real prices of electricity paid to wind energy from power plants installed
in different years and receiving the high FIT for 15 years. Data are in ¢(2011)/kWh.
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On-shore Off-shore
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2009 2010
2000 1032
2001 785 342
2002 849 369 444
2003 818 356 428 340
2004 957 417 501 398 303
2005 910 396 476 379 288 247
2006 905 394 473 377 286 246 298
2007 1052 458 551 438 333 286 347 251
2008 990 431 518 412 313 269 326 236 235
2009 865 376 452 360 274 235 285 206 205 270 6
2010 783 341 410 326 248 213 258 187 186 244 191 6 21
2011 875 381 458 364 277 238 288 209 208 273 214 6 20
2012 858 373 449 357 272 233 283 204 204 267 210 6 20
2013 841 366 440 350 266 228 277 200 200 262 205 5 20
2014 824 359 431 343 261 224 272 196 196 257 201 5 19
2015 679 352 423 336 256 219 266 193 192 252 197 5 19
2016 666 290 415 330 251 215 261 189 188 247 194 5 18
2017 653 284 342 323 246 211 256 185 184 242 190 5 18
2018 640 278 335 266 241 207 251 182 181 237 186 5 18
2019 627 273 328 261 198 203 246 178 177 233 182 5 17
2020 481 268 322 256 195 169 241 174 174 228 179 5 17
2021 481 209 316 252 193 167 205 171 170 224 175 5 17
2022 481 209 255 249 191 165 202 148 167 219 172 5 16
2023 481 209 255 206 189 163 200 146 147 215 169 4 16
2024 481 209 255 206 159 161 198 144 145 180 165 3 16
2025 209 255 206 159 139 196 143 143 177 140 3 11
2026 255 206 159 139 173 141 142 175 138 3 11
2027 206 159 139 173 127 140 173 136 3 11
2028 159 139 173 127 129 171 135 3 11
2029 139 173 127 129 148 133 2 11
2030 173 127 129 148 117 2 7
2031 127 129 148 117 2 7
2032 129 148 117 2 7
2033 148 117 2 7
2034 117 7
Table 17: annual remunerations for wind energy in the Medium FIT scenario. Data are in
Me(2011).
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Annualized remuneration 827 353 426 339 258 219 263 189 183 235 195
Equalized remuneration 827 1179 1606 1944 2202 2421 2684 2873 3056 3291 3486
Table 18: Annualized remuneration: annualized remuneration of every vintage of wind
capacity from year 2000 to year 2010. Equalized remuneration: sum of the annualized
remunerations of all capacity in service. Data are in Me(2011).
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D Solar equalized remunerations
This appendix shows in detail the calculations of the equalized remuneration for solar energy.
Table 19 shows the assumed electricity produced by each vintage of capacity from year 2000
to year 2010. It is calculated similarly to the corresponding table for wind (table 13). The
entries on the rows are calculated in the following way: for the period 2000-2010 we allocate
the historical annual electricity generated by solar (cf. table 2) assuming a constant annual
capacity factor; from 2010 to the end of the lifetime of the power plants we assume a constant
fixed capacity factor of 8.14%.
Table 20 shows the annual real price of electricity paid to solar energy. Results take into
account inflation and are in e(2011). Each column shows the annual electricity price paid to
solar energy generated by power plants installed in the year marked in the first row. Solar energy
producers receive a constant FIT for 20 years. Until 2003 there was a single level of FIT for all
solar facilities, while, from 2004 onwards, the level depends on the capacity and location of the
power plant. There are no data on the average level of FIT for solar power plants since 2004,
but we can make use of the historical data on the total expenditure of solar FIT (available from
2002, cf. table 1) to estimate it. For power plants built in the period 2000-2001, we assume that
they receive a FIT as in table 1 and we apply it for 20 years. As from year 2002, we estimate
the average FIT as follows: we take the annual total expenditure of solar FIT, we subtract the
assumed expenditure of FIT for power plants installed the years before by assuming annual
constant capacity factor, and we divide the result by the assumed total energy produced by the
facilities installed that year as in table 20. For example the average FIT for the power plants
build in 2002 is estimated by subtracting to the 2002 annual expenditure of solar FIT, which
is Me95 in e(2011) (cf. table 1), the quantity paid to the installations built in 2000 and 2001
assuming constant capacity factor (that is given by the sum of the first two elements of the third
row of table 19 times the corresponding elements of table 20), and dividing it by 60GWh (the
third element of the third row in table 19).
Table 21 shows the annualized payment for each vintage of capacity from year 2000 to
year 2010. Each entry in table 21 is given by multiplying the corresponding entry in table 19
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with the entry in table 20. Table 22 shows the annualized remuneration and the total equalized
remuneration. It is calculated similarly to table 18.
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
2000 64
2001 31 45
2002 42 60 60
2003 55 79 79 100
2004 38 55 55 70 337
2005 47 69 69 87 418 593
2006 58 84 84 106 513 728 646
2007 56 81 81 102 494 701 622 937
2008 55 79 79 100 484 687 609 918 1408
2009 50 73 73 92 445 631 559 843 1294 2517
2010 51 74 74 94 452 641 569 857 1315 2559 4995
2011 54 78 78 99 478 678 601 906 1390 2705 5281
2012 54 78 78 99 478 678 601 906 1390 2705 5281
2013 54 78 78 99 478 678 601 906 1390 2705 5281
2014 54 78 78 99 478 678 601 906 1390 2705 5281
2015 54 78 78 99 478 678 601 906 1390 2705 5281
2016 54 78 78 99 478 678 601 906 1390 2705 5281
2017 54 78 78 99 478 678 601 906 1390 2705 5281
2018 54 78 78 99 478 678 601 906 1390 2705 5281
2019 54 78 78 99 478 678 601 906 1390 2705 5281
2020 54 78 78 99 478 678 601 906 1390 2705 5281
2021 54 78 78 99 478 678 601 906 1390 2705 5281
2022 54 78 78 99 478 678 601 906 1390 2705 5281
2023 54 78 78 99 478 678 601 906 1390 2705 5281
2024 54 78 78 99 478 678 601 906 1390 2705 5281
2025 78 78 99 478 678 601 906 1390 2705 5281
2026 78 99 478 678 601 906 1390 2705 5281
2027 99 478 678 601 906 1390 2705 5281
2028 478 678 601 906 1390 2705 5281
2029 678 601 906 1390 2705 5281
2030 601 906 1390 2705 5281
2031 906 1390 2705 5281
2032 1390 2705 5281
2033 2705 5281
2034 5281
Table 19: assumed annual energy generated by solar capacity installed in different years.
Data are in GWh.
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2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
2000 60.4
2001 59.3 59.3
2002 58.4 58.4 57.5
2003 57.8 57.8 56.9 53.0
2004 56.9 56.9 56.0 52.1 58.4
2005 56.0 56.0 55.1 51.3 57.5 61.4
2006 55.2 55.2 54.3 50.5 56.6 60.5 57.9
2007 53.9 53.9 53.0 49.4 55.3 59.1 56.6 52.8
2008 52.5 52.5 51.7 48.1 53.9 57.6 55.1 51.4 48.2
2009 52.4 52.4 51.5 48.0 53.7 57.4 54.9 51.3 48.0 46.0
2010 51.8 51.8 50.9 47.4 53.1 56.8 54.3 50.7 47.5 45.4 38.5
2011 50.6 50.6 49.8 46.4 51.9 55.5 53.1 49.6 46.4 44.4 37.7
2012 49.6 49.6 48.8 45.4 50.9 54.4 52.1 48.6 45.5 43.5 36.9
2013 48.7 48.7 47.9 44.6 49.9 53.3 51.0 47.6 44.6 42.7 36.2
2014 47.7 47.7 46.9 43.7 48.9 52.3 50.0 46.7 43.8 41.9 35.5
2015 46.8 46.8 46.0 42.8 48.0 51.3 49.1 45.8 42.9 41.0 34.8
2016 45.8 45.8 45.1 42.0 47.0 50.3 48.1 44.9 42.1 40.2 34.1
2017 44.9 44.9 44.2 41.2 46.1 49.3 47.2 44.0 41.2 39.4 33.4
2018 44.1 44.1 43.4 40.4 45.2 48.3 46.2 43.2 40.4 38.7 32.8
2019 43.2 43.2 42.5 39.6 44.3 47.4 45.3 42.3 39.6 37.9 32.1
2020 5.0 42.4 41.7 38.8 43.4 46.4 44.4 41.5 38.9 37.2 31.5
2021 5.0 5.0 40.9 38.0 42.6 45.5 43.6 40.7 38.1 36.4 30.9
2022 5.0 5.0 5.0 37.3 41.8 44.6 42.7 39.9 37.3 35.7 30.3
2023 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 40.9 43.7 41.9 39.1 36.6 35.0 29.7
2024 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 42.9 41.1 38.3 35.9 34.3 29.1
2025 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 40.2 37.6 35.2 33.7 28.5
2026 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 36.8 34.5 33.0 28.0
2027 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 33.8 32.4 27.4
2028 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 31.7 26.9
2029 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 26.4
2030 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0
2031 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0
2032 5.0 5.0 5.0
2033 5.0 5.0
2034 5.0
Table 20: annual real prices of electricity paid to solar energy from capacity installed in
different years. Data are in ¢(2011)/kWh.
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2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
2000 39
2001 18 27
2002 24 35 35
2003 32 46 45 53
2004 22 32 31 36 197
2005 27 38 38 44 240 364
2006 32 46 46 54 290 440 374
2007 30 44 43 51 273 414 352 495
2008 29 42 41 48 261 395 336 472 679
2009 26 38 38 44 239 362 307 433 622 1157
2010 27 38 38 44 240 364 309 435 625 1163 1925
2011 27 40 39 46 248 376 319 449 646 1202 1989
2012 27 39 38 45 243 369 313 440 633 1178 1950
2013 26 38 38 44 238 362 307 432 621 1155 1912
2014 26 37 37 43 234 355 301 423 608 1132 1874
2015 25 37 36 42 229 348 295 415 597 1110 1837
2016 25 36 35 42 225 341 289 407 585 1088 1801
2017 24 35 35 41 220 334 283 399 573 1067 1766
2018 24 35 34 40 216 328 278 391 562 1046 1731
2019 23 34 33 39 212 321 272 383 551 1026 1697
2020 3 33 33 38 208 315 267 376 540 1005 1664
2021 3 4 32 38 203 309 262 369 530 986 1631
2022 3 4 4 37 200 303 257 361 519 966 1599
2023 3 4 4 5 196 297 252 354 509 947 1568
2024 3 4 4 5 24 291 247 347 499 929 1537
2025 4 4 5 24 34 242 340 489 911 1507
2026 4 5 24 34 30 334 480 893 1478
2027 5 24 34 30 45 470 875 1449
2028 24 34 30 45 70 858 1420
2029 34 30 45 70 135 1392
2030 30 45 70 135 264
2031 45 70 135 264
2032 70 135 264
2033 135 264
2034 264
Table 21: annual remunerations for solar energy. Data are in Me(2011).
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Annualized remuneration 25 35 35 41 217 333 281 385 542 989 1620
Equalized remuneration 25 60 94 136 353 685 966 1351 1893 2882 4503
Table 22: Annualized remuneration: annualized remuneration of every vintage of solar
capacity from year 2000 to year 2010. Equalized remuneration: sum of the annualized
remunerations of all capacity in service. Data are in Me(2011).
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